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The World Bank

Report No: 28372

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (CPL-36860 SCL-3686A) ON A LOAN

Public Disclosure Authorized

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$60 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA FOR THE ROADS REHABILITATION PROJECT

June 16, 2004

Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Department Central America Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective ) Currency Unit = Balboas 1 Balboa = US$ 1 US$ 1 = 1 Balboa FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AAC AMP ATTT CAS DINAMAN DINAC DINATRATE DIPRODI EA GOP HDM IDB IPDP LOA M&S MGJ MIPPE MOP PMIS QAG TSCU UE UECP

Civil Aviation Authority Autoridad de Aeronáutica Civil Ports and Maritime Authority Autoridad Marítima de Panamá Land Transport Authority Autoridad de Tránsito y Transporte Terrestre Country Assistance Strategy National Directorate of Maintenance (of MOP) National Directorate of Contract Administration (MOP) Dirección Nacional de Administración de Contratos National Directorate of Land Transport (of MOP) Dirección Nacional de Transporte Terrestre Directorate of Programming and Institutional Development (of MOP) Dirección de Programación y Desarrollo Institucional Environmental Assessment Government of Panama Highway Design and Maintenance Model Inter-American Development Bank Indigenous Peoples Development Plan Loan Agreement Monitoring and Supervision Ministry of Government and Justice Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy Ministerio de Planificación y Política Económica Ministry of Public Works Ministerio de Obras Públicas Pavement Management Information System Quality Assurance Group Transport Sector Coordination Unit Environmental Unit Special Project Coordination Unit

Vice President: Country Director Sector Manager Task Team Leader/Task Manager:

David de Ferranti Jane Armitage José Luis Irigoyen Emmanuel A. James

PANAMA PA ROADS REHABILITATION

CONTENTS

1. Project Data 2. Principal Performance Ratings 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 6. Sustainability 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 8. Lessons Learned 9. Partner Comments 10. Additional Information Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits Annex 4. Bank Inputs Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Annex 8. Project Evaluation by Borrower

Page No. 1 1 2 4 9 10 11 12 14 14 15 23 27 28 30 31 32 33

Project ID: P007844 Team Leader: Emmanuel A. James ICR Type: Core ICR

Project Name: PA ROADS REHABILITATION TL Unit: LCSFT Report Date: June 16, 2004

1. Project Data Name: PA ROADS REHABILITATION Country/Department: PANAMA

L/C/TF Number: CPL-36860; SCL-3686A Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Region

Sector/subsector: Roads and highways (93%); Central government administration (7%) Theme: Regulation and competition policy (P); Other urban development (P); Other financial and private sector development (P) KEY DATES PCD: 03/31/1993 Appraisal: 06/21/1993 Approval: 12/21/1993

Original Effective: 04/13/1994 MTR: 10/05/1996 Closing: 09/30/2000

Borrower/Implementing Agency: Other Partners: STAFF Vice President: Country Director: Sector Manager: Team Leader at ICR: ICR Primary Author:

Revised/Actual 04/13/1994 10/05/1996 09/30/2003

GOVT OF PANAMA/MIN OF PUBLIC WORKS

Current David de Ferranti Jane Armitage Jose Luis Irigoyen Emmanuel A. James Oswaldo Patiño; Andres Pizarro

At Appraisal S. Shahid Husain Edilberto Segura Martin J. Staab Peter Gyamfi

2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome:

Sustainability:

Institutional Development Impact:

Bank Performance:

Borrower Performance:

QAG (if available) Quality at Entry: Project at Risk at Any Time: No

ICR U

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective:

The development objectives were to: (a) increase competition in the road transport industry and provide the foundation for future regulatory reform; (b) improve the management of the transport sector through the coordination of investments and the formulation of policies; (c) continue strengthening the administration and maintenance of roads, through support to the Ministry of Public Works (MOP) in: (i) pavement management and (ii) private sector participation in maintenance; (d) assist the MOP in removing the existing road maintenance backlog and preventing its future occurrence through the implementation of a well-coordinated rehabilitation and maintenance program; and (e) reduce traffic congestion and provide more efficient, safer and reliable passenger transport service in the city of Panama and other major cities in the country. The project was intended to finance a four-year (1994-1997) slice of GOP’s Road Program that was to be parallel co-financed with the IDB. Project documentation consisted of a Memorandum to the President with a comprehensive technical annex and the IDB’s Project Document that was used in lieu of the Bank’s Staff Appraisal Report. 3.2 Revised Objective:

Project objectives were not revised during implementation. 3.3 Original Components:

To achieve the objectives described above, the project included the following components: 1. Urban transport. This component comprised the carrying out of urban transport sub-projects covering: (a) street rehabilitation and/or widening and maintenance, intersection improvement, improved signalization and traffic management and (b) institutional reforms and regulatory changes in public road transport. 2. Inter-urban roads. This included the carrying out of sub-projects and a pilot maintenance program for inter-urban roads. 3. Policy reform and institutional strengthening. This component aimed at: (1) strengthening of the Ministry of Public Works (MOP), Ministry of Economy and Planning (MIPPE) and Ministry of Government and Justice (MGJ) by: (a) improving the management and efficiency of the Borrower’s agencies within the transport sector; and (b) coordinating all the investments in the transport sector; (2) strengthening the MOP by: (a) addressing and resolving environmental issues within the transport sector, including the training of the staff required, (b) increasing the participation of the private sector in the Borrower’s transport sector and preparing future transport sector projects; and (3) implementation and evaluation of the Borrower’s Law 14 of May 26, 1993, on urban passenger transport. 3.4 Revised Components:

The original project components were maintained throughout implementation. 3.5 Quality at Entry:

The project predates the introduction of the QAG process at the Bank, hence no official quality at entry data are available. Nonetheless, the evidence available suggests that the quality at entry can be rated marginally satisfactory. In the sector context, the development objectives clearly corresponded to the issues and the needs identified at the time by the Borrower and the Bank. However, the objectives were not prioritized or organized in a manner more according to their scope or technical field. This is particularly the case for objectives (a) and (e). Objective (a) mixes both trucking industry and urban public transport regulation. These issues are fundamentally different in scope and complexity and normally require distinct treatment for their resolution. Objective (e) mixes traffic congestion and urban public transport, which despite being both urban transit -2-

issues, require somewhat different approaches, adequate management.

time frames, and institutional arrangements for their

In addition, there was no clear indication as to the relative importance of each objective. Although major policy reforms carry significant weight, due largely to the urgency existing at the time because of the dilapidated state of the road infrastructure, the loan mostly funded civil works. On balance, more resources should have been allocated to the project's policy and institutional components. In this context, the project objectives were over optimistic given that the proposed investments were geared, much more toward transport road rehabilitation with less emphasis on the policy and reform measures. Although the structural reforms were stated in a well-drafted Matrix of Policies and Reforms, the outcome indicators to measure and monitor these activities were over optimistic. For example, in order to achieve them, it was required that at the end of the first year of project execution (and with a newly elected government in place) that the following be achieved: (i) a total deregulation of the trucking industry and the creation of an institution that provided a more efficient bus system, (ii) improvement in MOP’s capacity for maintenance, whose indicators targeted 50% of routine maintenance as well as a reduction of the equipment fleet of the National Directorate of Maintenance (DINAMAN); and (iii) increase in private sector participation to 15% of resources assigned for maintenance together with a budgeted increase for periodic and routine maintenance, among other indicators. These tasks were clearly not achievable within the time frame proposed and without the appropriate studies and resources. Another area that needed to be addressed was the regulatory framework, and the urban public transport sector itself which needed institutional and policy reforms. While these were foreseen, the project did not target any specific investments for urban public transport, or focus specific technical assistance or studies for it. Instead, virtually all of the investments funding went to urban roads, and traffic signaling. A similar treatment was accorded to objective (e), which was based on the premise of an improvement in the performance of urban public transport companies, and in the “cupo” system (a system for allocating routes). With regard to the road rehabilitation and maintenance objective, the project intended to reduce the backlog of rehabilitation, and to assist the MOP in its efforts to transform itself into a more normative agency by relying more on the private sector to carry out road maintenance rather than by force account. Although, the investments were consistent with the objectives pursued and they were clearly defined, the targets (related to the cadre of personnel and to equipment reduction) were very ambitious, and not matched by equivalent efforts for ensuring the sustainability of maintenance funding. Finally, it is important to mention that the Bank’s team recognized that there were numerous institutional and policy reform issues that Panama faced in the urban and inter-urban transport sectors. The team realized that more leverage would be needed for implementing these difficult institutional and policy reforms. Therefore, the Bank proposed to the IDB a revision of the program design that would have involved splitting it into two projects: (i) an immediate inter-urban road rehabilitation and improvement project, (ii) an urban transport and transport sector reform project that could be conducted a few years later. This proposal was not accepted by the IDB due to the high level of commitment to the then program made already with the Panamanian government. A key question that could therefore arise concerning the program design is whether it would have been appropriate to go ahead with an ambitious program that included major policy reforms and investments or to focus at first on a project for inter-urban road rehabilitation and maintenance plus the appropriate institutional strengthening mix. The latter would have been a better approach because the project was -3-

going to be executed by a newly elected Government, which would have had to navigate the many problems faced by new governments in any country when implementing difficult policy measures.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

The overall satisfactory rating is justified by the fact that the project achieved its expected physical and output development objectives and an important part of its institutional reform objectives. Project design and loan resources were focused predominantly on the physical investments and these were largely achieved. MOP can now be considered to have improved its capacity to identify, prepare and implement projects, directly as a result of the numerous subprojects executed under the Project. Shortcomings were related to unsatisfactory quality at entry of policy components and unrealistic expectations for the implementation of these complez tasks. The IDB project had similar issues and approaches. Therefore, based on these facts, the project has been rated as overall satisfactory. An assessment of each development objective follows. (a) increase competition in the road transport industry and provide the foundation for future regulatory reform. The creation of ATTT (Autoridad de Transito y Transporte Terrestre) was a major achievement and it constitutes a good step for coordinating and better managing a fairly deregulated land transport sub-sector. It is important to mention that the ATTT was created by re-uniting two entities from MOP and MGJ, and by assigning to it the planning, management, and regulating functions of the land transport sector. This was a significant institutional step for future regulatory reform of the sector. ATTT remains fairly weak and needs capacity building and adequate funding for further institutional consolidation and development of its capacity to adequately regulate the land transport sector. Also, this institution will be in charge of implementing and operating the traffic and signal control system in Panama City. The designs and bidding documents for the traffic system were prepared under the project, and ATTT is actively seeking funding to implement a much larger scale system than that envisaged at project preparation. The implementation of the for-hire goods transport, which was deregulated, was not strictly enforced. However, it is worth noting that the transport market has increased enormously with the development of private ports in Panama, relegating this issue to a great extent. Therefore, this objective is rated marginally satisfactory (b) improve the management of the transport sector through the coordination of investments and the formulation of policies. The Transport Sector Coordination Unit (TSCU) under the General Secretary of MOP - whose creation was a condition of loan effectiveness and at some point had 4 professional staff was originally assigned the responsibility for the overall coordination of transport investments and policies. This unit was essentially non-operational since MOP has no statutory authority over the transport modes handled by other ministries. As mentioned in (a), since the establishment of the TSCU, the Government moved quickly on the concessioning of railways and major ports, thus reducing the need for coordinating transport investments centrally. However, with the technical assistance provided under the project, some of the TSCU key functions have been taken over by the newly created ATTT. As a result, project activities in this regard were less advanced than expected due to delays in establishing ATTT (only done by year 2000). Still, it is a major step forward to have road transport managed by two entities: ATTT and MOP. The scale and degree of coordination by these entities is satisfactory, especially given the fact that they are responsible for all of the road network (Panama being one of the few countries where the MOP is responsible for both urban and inter-city roads). This objective has been achieved marginally satisfactorily.

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(c) continue strengthening the administration and maintenance of roads, through support to MOP in: (i) pavement management; and (ii) private sector participation in maintenance. The project achievements have mixed results in that pavement management was successfully set up while contracting out maintenance has not achieved the targets proposed under the project. Key performance indicators (See Annex 1a) show that proposed outcomes for this objective (particularly regarding road maintenance funding and operation and private sector participation) have not been fully met due to shortage of road maintenance budget, insufficient road maintenance in terms of coverage and limited implementation of contract-based maintenance operations. The main issues are as follows: Road Maintenance Funding. The level of funding for routine maintenance has on average been below the annual targets established in the LOA of about US$21 million. Under the project, a study to establish alternative mechanisms to finance road maintenance and to determine the current needs for routine and periodic maintenance was carried out. The study findings showed that there is need for periodic and routine road maintenance of about US$50 million per year, once the entire network has been brought up to a maintainable state. Currently, the level of funding for both activities is about US$16.5 million. While lower than expected, this amount would be adequate for the key needs of the maintainable segments of the network if efficient implementation mechanisms are used. It is worth noting that, with project technical assistance funds, the MOP has prepared the corresponding Law for the creation of the Road Funding Mechanism that could provide the funds needed. This Law is in the process of being presented to Congress for approval and could in the future help to ensure sustainable funding for maintenance. Using Private Contractors for Road Maintenance. The technical assistance component under the project helped MOP to implement a Pilot Maintenance Program, which included: maintenance by medium-sized contractors, maintenance of specific road sectors by experienced contractors using maintenance by standard, and maintenance contracts with local community groups. However, these mechanisms for contracting maintenance are not being actively pursued by MOP due to shortage of funds and the force account based operations which are typically inefficient. On the positive side, the project has resulted in major significant achievements with the implementation of a coordinated rehabilitation program, together with the parallel IDB project, and has led to the rehabilitation, inter alia, of most of the Pan American Highway and the Panama-Colon road, the country’s two principal axes. As a result, since 1994, the condition of the road network has improved substantially; currently, 2,731 km or 32% of the 12,000 km of total paved road network are in good condition. The Pavement Management objective has been adequately achieved through the establishment of: (i) the highway data bank and (ii) a pavement management unit, which assists MOP’s planning and maintenance directorates through the PMIS (computerized Pavement Management Information System). Also, MOP staff is now skilled in the use of the Bank’s Highway Design Maintenance Model (HDM). The road management system still needs to be linked to all operational units of MOP, especially to work closely with DINAMAN (National Directorate for Maintenance) and DIPRODI (Program and Planning Directorate). However, DINAMAN requires increased financial resources to perform adequate monitoring and evaluation of the road network. The GOP must continue acting on a number of recommendations proposed by the technical assistance component, in particular with regard to adopting cost recovery mechanisms for the management and financing of road maintenance, increasing private sector participation in maintenance, improving procurement cycle and payment procedures for contractors, and continuing with capacity-building of the ATTT and MOP staff. Thus, this objective is rated satisfactorily for (c)(i) and unsatisfactory for (c)(ii).

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(d) assist the MOP in removing the existing road maintenance backlog and preventing its future occurrence through the implementation of a well-coordinated rehabilitation and maintenance program. The program has resulted in significant achievements with the successful implementation of a coordinated rehabilitation and maintenance program with Government investment reaching over US$750 million during 1994-2003. Project achievements in terms of civil works for inter-urban roads and urban streets have been fully satisfactory. MOP’s capacity has improved and it appears to have satisfactorily discharged its planning and operational responsibilities under the project through the identification, preparation and execution of road improvement plans during the ten-year implementation period. MOP is now familiar with Bank’s procurement procedures. In addition, environmental capacity has greatly improved through the establishment of an Environmental Unit (EU). As a result, the EU currently provides inputs such as initial environmental screening of road sub-project, drafting terms of reference for Environmental Assessment (EA) studies, approval of EA studies, as well as ensuring that new project specific environmental requirements are incorporated within the bidding documents. This unit is also providing field supervision for road works. Under the project, guidelines for the environmental assessment of transport investments have been prepared and EU staff was trained adequately. EU staff is currently ensuring that environmental impacts from MOP road activities are appropriately mitigated. The Environmental Division of the LAC region has expressed its approval of the performance of the EU on several occasions. Based on the above results the objective is rated satisfactory. It is worth noting that MOP has complied with the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) that was required prior to initiation of the rehabilitation of the sub-project for the Quebrada Aguacate-Canitas-Bayano road, (under the IDB package). The Indigenous Plan was implemented under several projects, the principal ones being the IDB's Darien Sustainable Project and the Panama Social Investment Fund. This plan was subject to three specific revisions during project execution by specialist social staff from LAC region. It has one of the first major IPDP prepared in the Bank and it contributed significantly to the introduction and mainstreaming of the IPDP concept. (e) reduce traffic congestion and provide more efficient, safer and more reliable passenger transport service in the city of Panama and other major cities in the country. Due to project investments, some success has been reached with functional pedestrian bridges, horizontal and vertical signals and road signing programs in Panama City and other major towns, as well as realignments to improve road safety and eliminate accident black spots. However, it is important to note that these improvements are focused on specific locations and hence it is difficult to assign specific effects on overall traffic congestion or road safety. Reportedly both factors have deteriorated during recent years but it is also clear that conditions would have been worse without the project. On the other hand, the proposed traffic signal program in Panama City was not implemented due to delays in the initial project preparation combined with the change of institutional set-up (DINATRATE and TSCU becoming ATTT), and later with ATTT’s own plans to implement a much larger system than envisaged originally. ATTT is planning now to finance this larger traffic system with its own budget together with a loan from bilateral or multilateral banks. As far as passenger transport services are concerned, the establishment of ATTT represented the startup of measures to conceive and manage improvements to improve passenger transport services. The sector still needs further institutional strengthening and investments. To ATTT’s credit, this agency is moving ahead with some of the initiatives necessary to improve the sector issues pending, such as the reform of the “cupo” system. Therefore, this objective was achieved marginally satisfactorily.

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4.2 Outputs by components:

The time-slice project implied that the UECP should present pluri-annual programs, which included urban and inter-urban sub-projects selected on the basis of technical, economic, financial and environmental criteria satisfactory to the Bank. A first batch of sub-projects was proposed and appraised in 1993 and was clearly defined in the IDB Loan document. The initial package covered 43 sub-projects for the period 1994-1997. These sub-projects included 5 for inter-urban road rehabilitation, 2 for road signaling; 5 for intersection improvements, 3 for road widening, 4 for pedestrian crossings, 1 vehicle overpass, 2 for urban street signaling, 16 for road rehabilitation and 6 for periodic maintenance. From these broad outputs to be achieved, the project executing unit prepared pluri-annual packages which included the subprojects to be implemented in a 2-3 year period. The execution of the first plan took more time than expected and used up most of the investment funds budgeted. However, some additional packages were added to this plan for the period 2000-2003. It is important to mention that most of the 47 work contracts have been successfully completed. This accounts for most of the funds disbursed. Below there is a listing of some of the subprojects completed. Inter-urban component. The project successfully achieved the following: (i) 172 km rehabilitated through 5 specific projects; (ii) 43 km with improved signaling, including a signaling package for the Province of Colon; (iii) 10 km of the Capira-Sajalices section of the Pan-American Highway widened; and (iv) 18.75 km maintained through 2 specific sub-projects as part of the Pilot Routine Maintenance Program. Urban component. The component financed successfully the following sub-projects: (i) 18 civil work packages for street rehabilitation sub-projects in Panama, Chitre, Santiago, Penonome, Colon, among others; (ii) 10 periodic maintenance sub-projects for Chorrera, Arraijan, Pedregal, among others; (iii) 3 widening and extension sub-projects in Panama City; (iv) 4 km of intersection improvements in Panama City; (v) 7 pedestrian bridges in Panama city and Colon; and (vi) 50 km of streets with improved signaling. Only the Panama City traffic signaling system was not carried out, due in part to the ATTT plan to implement a more comprehensive system than that envisaged at appraisal. Despite this, the overall outputs in the urban component are consistent with the outputs envisaged at appraisal. Technical Assistance Component. Most of the proposed studies were carried out, including: the road safety study, the maintenance financing alternatives, the road sector management, and the IPDP. Also, assistance was provided to improve MOP managerial capacity, with the most important being: the development and implementation of the Road Management Information System together with the road inventory and traffic counts and data bank, the environmental guidelines and the Urban Transport Plan. It is important to mention that extensive training has been successfully provided to regular MOP staff in key positions and in particular the staff of the EU and the maintenance units. Approximately, 227 MOP staff have been trained in different technical areas. All of these activities and training courses have contributed to the institutional development impact in MOP. The pilot design for the maintenance program and for the contracting out of the routine maintenance were carried out successfully with different models, the idea was to introduce the differing notions of routine and periodic maintenance and seek opportunities of developing the contracting out of maintenance activities. However, this component received too little attention, only two contracts were awarded and US$110,000 of the $US500,000 available loan proceeds were spent, although it was key for the sustainability of maintenance operations. The maintenance contracts that were carried out do not provide a sufficient basis to assess the pros and cons of contracting out routine maintenance.

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4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

An ex-post cost-benefit analysis was carried out for 5 representative sub-projects in 5 project cities. This sample included two urban and three inter-urban roads financed under the Bank-project. The economic analysis was undertaken using HDM III model. The main differences between ex-ante and ex-post analysis are an overall cost reduction of 5%, somewhat lower than forecast traffic volumes, and a longer construction period. It is important to mention that the cost reduction occurred due to excellent supervision of consultants and contractors by UECP and as a result of good engineering designs that were prepared. Also, the executing agency was able to minimize claims thereby generating modest savings in the implementation of the civil works. The principal benefits of “with the project” compared to “without the project” include: (i) savings in vehicle operating cost due to road improvement and rehabilitation, (ii) time saving for passengers and (iii) savings in routine maintenance. The estimated IERRs for the roads continue to be positive ranging between 15.4% for Volcan-Cerro Punta, to 76.5% for Rio Chagres-Rio Gatun. Based on this example, the average economic rate of return has been estimated at 39.2%, which is below the 67.6% average anticipated at the appraisal, due mainly to overestimation of traffic counts at appraisal. The rates of return are still highly acceptable. 4.4 Financial rate of return:

Not applicable. 4.5 Institutional development impact:

The project provided solid contributions to the institutional development of the transport sector in Panama. In particular, the project (a) assisted in the development of a Road Fund Law through the study for Financing Mechanism for Maintenance; (b) improved pavement management through the introduction of a pavement management system; (c) strengthened the capacity for maintenance management, procurement, environment, urban road transport planning, and economic analysis of inter-urban and urban sub-projects; (d) developed (i) the urban transport plan for Panama City, (ii) the first major Indigenous Peoples Development Plan prepared under a road project and (iii) the guidelines for environmental assessment of transport investments; (e) promoted private sector participation through the development of a pilot maintenance program with different contracting options; (f) established the Environmental Unit for environment mitigation, social and resettlement programs; and (g) strengthened MOP’s institutional and managerial capacity. In regard to the latter, the project assisted MOP in strengthening the National Directorate of Contracts Administration, the Directorate of Highways, the Directorate of Programming and Institutional Development, the National Directorate of Land Transport, the National Directorate of Maintenance, and the Environmental Unit, among others. As a result, MOP is carrying out better analyses for inter-urban and urban sub-projects in terms of (i) contracting out of feasibility studies and engineering final designs, (ii) improved monitoring of the supervision of civil works and road rehabilitation with private companies, and (iii) performing and supervising environmental assessments. The acquired experience has been demonstrated through the implementation and execution of a relatively large rehabilitation road program – over US$750 million during the project execution period- in coordination with multilateral institutions and other donors, as well as the management of the construction of the new bridge across the Panama Canal. Hence, as a direct result of the project, (i) the ATTT was created, (ii) the MOP has acquired the capacity to manage large road program and created the Environmental Unit, and (iii) through the preparation of the IPDP, there has been an increased awareness of the importance of the needs to respect the rights and

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cultures of native indigenous people.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

The original loan closing date of September 2000 was extended twice. The first 18-month extension to March, 2002 was granted in order to permit: (i) the completion of the rehabilitation of the Volcan to Cerro Punta Road; (ii) safety investments on critical roads (black spot improvements and intersection, pedestrian bridges, and signing and marking in Panama City), (iii) the rehabilitation of priority streets in secondary cities; (iv) the extension of the pilot routine maintenance program; (iv) a training program, and (vi) implementation of a computerized infrastructure management system. The second extension to September 30, 2003 was given at the Government’s request in order to complete the installation of the computerized accounting system as well as to complete the safety component activities and some road rehabilitation works, which were in execution. The Bank denied a Government request in August 2003 for a third and final 9 month extension, mainly because of the age of the project. Staff turnover due to changeover in government administration. During implementation, there was considerable staff turnover at the executing unit and MOP. Over the life of the project, Panama had three different governments: one that prepared, appraised and negotiated the project, a second one during the project's entry into effectiveness and startup (1994) and the current one that was elected in 1999. During 2000, three different Ministers were in charge of the MOP. This resulted in several changes in project coordinators and key staff within the MOP, which adversely affected continuity and resulted in delays in project implementation. Force Majeure events. The rainy seasons in Panama of approximately 8-10 months a year delayed the road sub-projects implementation. It is difficult to rehabilitate roads during these heavy rains. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

Untimely provision of local counterpart funds. The untimely release of counterpart funds compounded by the insufficient amount has been a factor that affected project implementation performance significantly both in civil works and technical assistance components. Protracted procurement and payment procedures. The procurement and payment process designed by MOP’s directorate, DINAC, is bureaucratic and lengthy. There were multiple contract preparation, celarance and effectiveness steps imposed by the Contraloria General de la Republica, that required a lot of time and resourcefulness for their completion. For example, about four months elapsed between the no-objection and the signing of a typical contract. In addition, and with some overlapping, there were the contract vetting and payment procedures which used the UNDP-based financial and project management system (called "Dinamization") that had been introduced by the Government for transparency purposes. This “Dinamization” did achieve partially its objective of reducing the time required for effecting payments to contractors. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

Use of World Bank Standard Bidding documents. After loan effectiveness, it took one year to agree on the format of the documents to be used for civil works bidding, since substantial adjustments were required to previous local practices in order to permit use of the World Bank Standard Bidding Documents. Project Monitoring. The key outcomes of performance identified at design and appraisal and stated in the Memorandum of the President were not followed through by the implementing agency to monitor and supervise outcomes such as the length of network maintained, or by the level of funds to be allocated for -9-

routine and periodic maintenance, reduction of equipment, and progress in substituting private contractors for MOP force account in the execution of roads and bridge maintenance, among others. Also, the executing agency should have carefully monitored the Action Plan Matrix for Policy Reform and Institutional Strengthening agreed at negotiations. MOP staffing is still at the 1996 target level and funding for periodic and routine maintenance is low compared to project targets and much too low vis-a vis the requirements for the maintainable segments of the 12,000 km network road. Financial Management System. UECP’s performance was weak in terms of establishing an accounting and financial control system. The unit did not have a computerized project management information system, and only in year 2002 was the system in place and operational. The lack of an adequate financial and accounting management system for a long period of time generated moderate but manageable problems in presenting external financial audit reports and delayed contractors’ payments, among others. 5.4 Costs and financing:

As of December 2003, the total cost of the program amounted to the equivalent of US$474.2 million, which is 14.4 percent higher than the appraisal estimate of US$406 million. The Government's share increased substantially from US$166 million to US$240 million, principally to finance and rehabilitate other roads with current budgetary allocations agreed in principle with the IDB. The US$180 million loan from the co-financier IDB was practically fully disbursed while the US$60 million from WB loan proceeds were not disbursed totally due mainly to the delays in project execution, and the need for MOP to prepare and implement 3 multi-year plans. With respect to cost sharing, at appraisal, the project was to be financed 80% by the Bank and 20% by the GOP; the final figures are 75% and 25% respectively. This change is due partly to the GOP's fully financing the completion of the program after the September 2003 Loan closing. Project costs details are given in Annexes 2a (Project Costs by Component), 2b (Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements) and 2c (Project Financing by Component).

6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

The project has substantially improved MOP’s capacity to execute projects. Although, progress was made in planning, selecting, evaluating and supervising, it is of concern to see that overall financing for maintenance has decreased over the project’s life, and the number of kilometers of the national network maintained has accordingly decreased (see Annex 1f). The sustainability of the outcomes achieved under the urban and inter-urban road components will depend mainly on MOP continuing efforts to obtain the approval of the Law for the creation of a maintenance fund through user charges. The latter will permit the implementation of the institutional and financial reforms needed within MOP not only to increase the level of funding for periodic and routine maintenance, but also to restructure maintenance operations. These reforms should take place together with an increase in private sector participation in periodic and routine road maintenance by applying the experience gained through the pilot maintenance program implemented under the project. With regard to the urban sector, MOP has successfully managed urban civil works components – improvements of road intersections, traffic signals and accident black spots elimination. However, the joint tasks with the ATTT related to the reduction of traffic congestion and provision of more efficient and reliable passenger service in the City of Panama represent major challenges with regard to sustainability. Although the ATTT agency has been successfully created and has taken charge of its management,

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planning and regulating functions, there is still room for improvement in critical areas within the sector such as the (i) analysis and definition of investment options to improve public transport in Panama City, (ii) installation of a modern traffic signaling system, and (iii) capacity building for ATTT staff. Based on the achieved results, especially the mainstreaming of the project cycle within the UECP and the excellent management of the rehabilitation program, the sustainability is likely. It is important to mention that the UECP is currently managing other projects from multilateral banks worth over US$150 million using the project cycle mechanisms established under the project, as well as the construction of the second bridge over the Panama canal (US$103.9 million, excluding the access roads). 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

Most of the project activities were carried out by different MOP Directorates, although the UECP coordinated the process. In this repect, project execution was streamlined in all Directorates, thus no intervention is necessary as transition has been naturally occurring. Planning and sector coordination activities have not been as successfully internalized in MOP, so additional efforts are necessary to strengthen these fields in the future. In the urban sector, the project made progress in the institutional development aspects, through the creation of ATTT, re-uniting planning, policy formulation and regulation in one body. ATTT as such is trying to improve the regulatory framework, and thus improve the reliability and safety of the passenger transport sector. The relative weakness of ATTT due to its recent creation, and the complexity of the task at hand is such that only modest progress has been made. For this, and to ensure sustainability, it is crucial to continue with the strengthening of ATTT’s staff in planning and policy formulation.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending:

The project was identified through “piggy backing” on IDB’s appraisal. Under this approach, the Bank used the IDB appraisal report and only a Memorandum of the President together with a technical annex were prepared. Only a few missions visited Panama; Bank staff joined the IDB pre-appraisal and appraisal missions. During the missions, the Bank staff proposed a two-phase approach as mentioned, both to be co-financed with IDB and the Bank. The proposal was not accepted due to IDB's relatively advanced commitments to the GOP. Hence, while it was probably a cost-effective approach on balance the Bank performance during preparation must be regarded as weak. 7.2 Supervision:

Bank supervision is rated satisfactory. During project implementation, Bank assistance focused more on the streamlining of the project cycle under the administration of MOP as well as on the procurement of civil works, goods and the hiring of consultants. However, the Bank paid little attention to the progress of policy reform in the sectors, especially in the public transport sector. Other factors that affected the supervision were the turnover of task managers together with the high turnover of project coordinators at UECP and Ministers. On average, the Bank conducted two and a half supervisions per year. 7.3 Overall Bank performance:

Bank performance is rated overall as being satisfactory. This rating is based primarily on the achievements of the civil works component. In addition, the lead co-financier (IDB) in its PCR (Project Completion Report) also rated its performance as satisfactory. The overall rating for the execution of the joined IDB-WB project was also satisfactory.

- 11 -

Borrower 7.4 Preparation:

Borrower performance during the preparation stage is rated satisfactory. The MOP staff assisted the IDB’s team in preparing the project and helped the Bank staff during the pre-appraisal and appraisal missions. It is important to mention that the MOP undertook and prepared a large investment program with the IDB after many years of inactivity as well as supported the preparation of the Policies and Reforms Matrix. The MOP has continued preparing investment projects efficiently. 7.5 Government implementation performance:

The overall performance of the Government is rated marginally satisfactory. Delays in declaring loan effectiveness and later difficulties in the provision of counterpart funds in a timely manner had a strong negative impact on project performance throughout its execution. The procurement and financialmanagement mechanism for approving and processing contracts together with the complex payment cycle for contractors created additional delays that hindered project implementation. 7.6 Implementing Agency:

The performance of MOP, through its executing unit (UECP) is rated as highly satisfactory. The project constituted the first Bank lending operation after a long period of inactivity in Panama. The UECP experienced difficulties in procurement and keeping adequate records of disbursem*nts and in the installation of the accounting and financial system. However, the UECP successfully managed the loans from IDB and the Bank. The key factors that supported the high rating are that the unit: (i) managed the implementation of the technical assistance component as well as the training component, (ii) adequately developed the capacity building of most of the MOP’s Directorates involved in the multi-year investment programs, and (iii) prepared other major investment programs for the Government such as the CAF loan for US$60 million, a second loan from IDB for US$85 million, the construction of the second bridge over the Panama canal with investments of over US$100 million, and a third loan from IDB for US$37 million. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

Borrower performance is rated overall as satisfactory. This rating takes into account the strong performance demonstrated by the MOP through its executing unit together with the unsatisfactory rating of Government performance on the timeliness of counterpart funding.

8. Lessons Learned Several lessons can be obtained from the implementation of this project, some of these are: Project Design and Policy implications In the loan agreement, a mechanism or clause should be included for Government to budget for periodic and routine maintenance adequately. In the Loan Agreement (schedule 6), it was stipulated that the Borrower should provide funds for maintenance of the urban and inter-urban roads through an annual budget allocation of US$21.0 million. This was introduced as a Table but no reference was made to a covenant clause within the LOA. Because of this, the borrower did not have the obligation to comply with this important requirement. Over the life of the project, GOP assigned to MOP less than US$16 million on average per year. If this level of funding continues indefinitely, there is a risk that roads rehabilitated under the project could deteriorate due to lack of maintenance.

- 12 -

Adjust project design in a manner more consistent with the investments. It would have been preferable to work under the time-slice project in two phases. The first would have been a transport rehabilitation project with technical assistance to MOP to streamline its capacity to plan and manage projects and funds for the preparation of the second phase. The second would have been an urban transport project, including a quick disbursing policy-based component, rehabilitation and maintenance component, urban and road sub-projects with a technical assistance to strengthen MOP and the regulating entity for the urban public transport. It is very difficult to manage two such sub-sectors in one operation as was attempted. Prepare the Operational Manual, as well as ensure that an accounting and management information system is in place, prior to loan effectiveness. An operational manual that describes a summary framework of the project design, policies, definitions, indicators, procurement procedures, guidelines and plans should be agreed with the Bank, prior to effectiveness. Also, the borrower should install a financial management system at the same time. During project implementation, these activities were carried out very late within the cycle. Project Implementation Lack of continuity in the political environment and project management negatively affect implementation. Successful implementation of the project is highly dependent on the stability of key project management staff, both at the local and Bank levels, and a stable political environment. Project implementation suffered from various changes in Ministers, Project Coordinators and, on the Bank side, task managers. Maintaining stability in the Project Management Unit, as well as in the other operational units involved in the project could help to guarantee an effective management and administrative performance. Use of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system, and follow through the key outcome indicators. The project did not develop an appropriate M&E system to follow throughout the implementation period so as to measure outputs, outcomes and impacts, nor did it include initially any computerized project financial management and monitoring systems. Without the system indicators, the project staff was unable to effectively monitor implementation and progress in fulfilling the development objectives. As a result, Bank supervision teams were often unable to identify delays and issues early enough to propose timely remedial measures to achieve the outcomes proposed at appraisal. Detailed implementation action plans and specific measurable indicators and targets are essential factors to incorporate into project design as monitoring tools and as “early warning devices”. Role of supervision missions. Bank supervision missions should be geared to provide technical support to local staff in order to keep the basic concepts of project design on track and to discuss required mutually acceptable adjustments. During project implementation the Bank assistance was focused more on the procurement of civil works, goods and consultants, while insufficient attention was given to the policy and reforms measures needed to achieve project objectives. IPDP should have ownership from the beneficiary indigenous communities. The IPDP was a comprehensive plan, which not only focused on the roads to be rehabilitated but also on the needs and the development agenda in other sub sectors like water and education. It is important to mention that the indigenous communities took full ownership of the IPDP and used this plan to leverage funds for implementation by indigenous initiation not only from Bank financed projects such as the FIS project but also from other donors and Government institutions.

- 13 -

9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency:

A final evaluation report prepared by the Borrower is included in the Annex 8. The Borrower’s conclusion is that despite the difficulties encountered during preparation and implementation of the Project, most of the project objectives were achieved satisfactory, substantially contributing to the country’s progress. (b) Cofinanciers:

A separate ICR report issued by the IDB considers the project implementation to have been fully successful. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

Not applicable.

10. Additional Information Not applicable.

- 14 -

Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Annex 1a Outcome/Impact Indicators KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

COMMENTS

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING Staffing Strength Ratio Key Staff Staff Receiving Training

There was never any clarity as to the meaning of this Target since 1994: 107 p. Total since 1995: 227 p

Target Real Target Real Target Real

4583 4455 85

4117 4384 90

3683 4026 100

2955 4421 100

2955 3944 100

2955 3826

2955 2526

3214

3207

10 3

30 13

30 8

25 50

12 67

34.7/ 111.2/ 83.0 132.0 28.3/ 26.3/ 35.4 32.1 81.55% 23.65%

79.1/ 182.3 20.4/ 26.8 25.79%

57.7/ 118.9 18.7/ 26.8 32.41%

120.9/ 225.5 36.1/ 65.1 29.86%

112.3/ 149.6 66.8/ 80.9 59.48%

107.3/ 145.5 27.06/ n/a 37.75%

39.0 83.4 17.6 66.8 21 16.6

39.0 44.96 19.2 27.06 21 17.9

INVESTMENT Total Investments

(Achieved/Budgeted)

Net Investments financed by Government Of which Government financed

(Achieved/Budgeted)

101.8/ 43.9/ 135.4 156.6 34.24/ 6.83/ n/a 45.68 33.63% 15.55%

GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION Total Counterpart Funds Routine Maintenance

Target Real Target Real Target Real

30.8 n./a 9.3 n/a 21.5 8.6

40.2 n/a 19.0 n/a 21.2 16.4

39.4 37.6 18.5 20.4 20.9 17.2

39.0 n/a 18.1 n/a 20.9 19.3

39.0 n/a 18.1 n/a 20.9 15.8

47.54

28.03

34.24

16.83

13.3

11.2

248

20.2

16.13

6.91

4.83

13.37

11.30

URBAN PASSENGER TRANSPORT % Carried by Bus Companies

Information requested

Target

No. of New Cupos

Information requested

Real Target Real

Target

Real

124

248

42 13.91 20 5.31 22 8.60 30

41 32.58 20 15.56 21 17.02 32

40 36.62 19 18.27 21 18.35 35

39 34.80 18 14.36 21 20.44 35

39 26.59 18 10.65 21 15.94 35

39 27.22 18 10.41 21 16.81

39 27.97 18 9.02 21 18.95

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT Days for Approval of Signed Contracts ROAD MAINTENANCE Expenditures (US$ million) Periodic Routine % of Total Road Expenditures

Target Real Target Real Target Real Target Real

- 15 -

NETWORK MAINTAINED -Interurban Roads Rehabilitation (Km.) Periodic Maintenance Routine Maintenance

-Urban Roads Rehabilitation (Km.) Periodic Maintenance Routine Maintenance

Target

281

280

Real Target Real Targ et Real Target

212 704 n/a 7720

212 700 n/a 7720

212 700 529 7720

212 700 662 7720

172 700 379 7720

172

257

198

n/a 43

n/a 50

3416 50

3236

3721

2053

2234

Real Target Real Target Real

94 33 n/a 500 n/a

94 30 n/a 500 n/a

94 30 258 500 1 356

257

178

131

135

1558

1782

1522

1191

Target

Real Target

2.6 699

11.3 546

16.9 433

13.8 424

3.1

0.9

3.9

0.4

0.6

Real Target

n/a 11

n/a 7

n/a 2

n/a 0

1358

1407

1414

1334

Real

CONTRACT MAINTENANCE % of Total Maintenance (financing) Disposition of DINAMAN’s (# of pieces) Disposition of Industrial Equip. (# of pieces)

Includes quarry sites, asphalt and culvert plants.

- 16 -

Annex 1b Output Indicators Key Performance Indicators 1. CIVIL WORKS 1.1 Interurban roads Road rehabilitation Road signaling Road widening Pilot Routine Maintenance Program 1.2. Urban streets Street Rehabilitation Periodic Maintenance Widening and extensions Intersection improvements Pedestrian Bridges Signage and signaling 2. EQUIPMENT 2.1 Signals and signal systems 2.2 Vehicles 2.3 Equipment Computer and software 3. CONSULTING SERVICES 3.1 Studies Road Safety Maintenance and Financing Alternatives Transport Sector Management Review of Transport Law Public Passenger Transport Tariffs Indigenous Peoples development Plan 3.2 Technical Assistance Studies Data bank, HDM/SAM Traffic and signals Vehicle weight control Environment Laboratory Maintenance Contracting Management Transport industry Urban transport planning Individual Consultants UCST 3.3 Training Short-term Long-term

Unit

SAR Estimate

Actual

Km Km Km Km

5 contracts 2 contracts 2 contracts

172.08 42.84 10.10 18.75

Km Km Km Km Units Km

16 contracts 5 contracts 3 contracts 5 contracts 4 contracts 2 contracts

118.78 77.83 8.10 4 7 49.9

Units Units

1 9

Cancelled 9

Units

For transit police, laboratory and environment units of MOP

Units Units Units Units Units Units

1 1 1 1 1 1

Completed Completed Cancelled Proposed maintenance fund loan Cancelled Completed

Units Units Units Units Units Units Units Units Units Units Units

7 2 1 4 1

Completed 3 systems executed Completed Completed Completed

Completed

2 3 1

Completed 3 1

Units Units

24 87

227

- 17 -

Annex 1c Studies included in project Study 1. STUDIES Road Safety Study Maintenance Financing Alternatives

Purpose

Campaign for road and transit safety.

Status

Completed

No follow up action

Completed

Pilot Routine Maintenance Program. Two contracts and draft law for creating road fund. Institutional strengthening to urban sector completed. ATTT created and in operation.

Private sector participation and road fund

Road Sector Management Administration of traffic management. Public Passenger Transport Tariffs Indigenous People’s Development Plan

Completed Cancelled

Due to rehabilitation of roads.

2. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE Road Design Standards (IDB) Strengthening road rehabilitation private sector capacity Data bank, HDM/SAM Strengthening planning capacity. Traffic and signals Improve traffic management. Vehicle weight control (IDB) and dimensions Environment Strengthening environment units and road rehabilitation execution. Laboratory (IDB) Maintenance contracting management Implementation of Road Sector Management Transport industry Urban transport plan

Impact Of Study

Pilot program for routine maintenance. Implementation UCST parts A and B

- 18 -

Completed

Implemented by FIS and other institutions.

Completed

Adopted by MOP and private sector.

Completed Cancelled Completed

In operation

Completed

Road rehabilitation studies following environmental criteria.

Completed

Soil mechanics equipment procured. Laboratory deemed to function. Not adopted due to lack of funds.

Completed

Annex 1d Overseas training for MOP staff (proposed at SAR) Type of Training

DIPRODI

DINAC

DINAMAN

DINATRATE

Long-term training - Highway Management - Contract Management - Pavement Management - Maintenance Management - Road Rehabilitation - HDM-III - Highway safety - Environment and highways - Computer applications - Training

4 2 1 2 4 4 4 -

2 6 4 1 2 2 -

2 4 4 8 4 4 2 2 -

2 2 2 2 3 2 2 -

Short-term training - Traffic engineering/planning - Environment and highways - Highway safety - Contract administration - Highway management

2 6 2

2 1 2 1

1 1

2 1 2 1

Overseas training for MOP staff (executed)

- 19 -

Annex 1e Institutional Arrangements of the Project Components

Primary Responsibility

Collaborators

Operation & Maintenance/ Continuity of Program

1. Improvement and Rehabilitation Annual selection of projects Feasibility Studies Design, Contracting, Supervision 2. Periodic Maintenance Selection of Projects Contracting, supervision 3. Routine Maintenance Selection of projects Contracting Supervision 4. Intersections & Corridors Supervision of projects Feasibility Design, Contracting and supervision 5. Traffic Signals Supervision of projects Feasibility Design, Contracting and supervision 6. Road safety -Critical Spots Data Collection and Analysis Design of Remedies Contracting and supervision -Road safety campaign -Highway Police 7. Studies and Tech. Asst.

DIPRODI DIPRODI

DINATRATE, DINAMAN, DINAC DINATRATE (urban), DINAMAN (Maint. & Rehab.), DINAC

DINAC

DIPRODI DINAC

DIPRODI DIPRODI / DINAMAN DINAC/ Dirección Ejecutiva de Estudio y Diseño / DNI

DINAMAN, DINATRATE (urban)

DINAMAN DINAC DINAMAN

DIPRODI DINAC / DNI DINAMAN DINAC DINAMAN / DNI

DIPRODI DIPRODI DINAC

DINATRATE

DNI DIPRODI / DINAMAN DINAC

DINATRATE DINATRATE DINAC

DIPRODI DIPRODI DINATRATE

ATTT ATTT ATTT

MGJ DINAC DINAC MGJ MGJ DIPRODI

DINATRATE, MGJ

Affected Agencies

- 20 -

ATTT ATTT ATTT ATTT ATTT MGJ

Annex 1f Maintenance Expenditure/Length of Network Maintained Interurban Forced Account Routine Periodic $US $US km km (millions) (millions) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 9.49 n/a 11.73 n/a 8.43 n/a 10.22 n/a 10.54 n/a 9.85 3,397 8.66 523 6.00 3,164 10.01 662 7.96 3,614 10.22 379 6.16 2,026 6.93 257 4.42 2,212 6.25 198 2.98

Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Total $US (millions) n/a 21.22 18.65 20.39 14.66 17.96 16.38 11.35 9.23

km 5,246 3,781 3,900 4,707 3,919 3,826 3,993 2,284 2,504

Contracted Routine Periodic $US $US km km (millions) (millions) 0 0.00 18 0.36 159 0.57 138 2.17 226 1.10 117 1.91 17 0.25 66 1.26 19 0.14 6 0.70 72 0.25 0 0.00 107 1.09 0 0.00 27 0.08 0 0.00 22 0.10 0 0.00

Total km 18 297 343 83 25 72 107 27 22

% Contracted

$US (millions) 0.36 2.74 3.01 1.50 0.83 0.25 1.09 0.08 0.10

km 0.3% 7.3% 8.1% 1.7% 0.6% 1.8% 2.6% 1.2% 0.9%

$US (millions) n/a 11.4% 13.9% 6.9% 5.4% 1.3% 6.2% 0.7% 1.0%

Urban Forced Account Routine Periodic $US $US km km (millions) (millions) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.96 n/a 0.71 n/a 8.82 n/a 2.98 n/a 8.80 n/a 0.82 1,356 7.13 258 3.95 1,558 6.56 257 2.46 1,782 7.64 178 2.86 1,522 6.37 131 2.49 1,191 4.95 135 1.85

Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Total $US (millions) n/a 7.66 11.80 9.61 11.09 9.01 10.50 8.86 6.80

km 1,170 1,778 1,642 1,550 1,615 1,814 1,960 1,653 1,234

Contracted Routine Periodic $US $US km km (millions) (millions) 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 39 0.96 0 0.00 63 3.16 22 0.86 35 2.43 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00

Total km 0 39 63 58 0 0 0 0 0

% Contracted

$US (millions) 0.00 0.96 3.16 3.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

km 0.0% 2.1% 3.7% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

$US n/a 11.1% 21.1% 25.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Total Forced Account Routine Periodic $US $US km km (millions) (millions) n/a 9 n/a 5 n/a 16.45 n/a 12.44 n/a 17.25 n/a 13.19 n/a 19.33 n/a 10.67 4,753 15.80 781 9.95 4,721 16.56 919 10.41 5,396 17.87 557 9.02 3,549 13.29 388 6.91 3,404 11.20 333 4.83

Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Total $US (millions) 14 28.88 30.45 30.00 25.75 26.98 26.89 20.20 16.03

km 6,416 5,559 5,542 6,257 5,534 5,640 5,953 3,937 3,738

Contracted Routine Periodic $US $US km km (millions) (millions) 0 0.00 18 0.36 159 0.57 176 3.12 226 1.10 180 5.08 39 1.11 101 3.69 19 0.14 6 0.70 72 0.25 0 0.00 107 1.09 0 0.00 27 0.08 0 0.00 22 0.10 0 0.00

km 18 335 406 140 25 72 107 27 22

% Contracted

$US (millions) 0.36 3.70 6.18 4.80 0.83 0.25 1.09 0.08 0.10

km 0.3% 5.7% 6.8% 2.2% 0.4% 1.3% 1.8% 0.7% 0.6%

$US (millions) 2.6% 11.3% 16.9% 13.8% 3.1% 0.9% 3.9% 0.4% 0.6%

Length of Network Maintained

6,000

5,000

4,000

Kilometers

$US Millions

Maintenance Expenditure

Total

10 5

3,000 2,000 1,000

0 1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Routine by F.A.

Periodic by F.A.

Routine by Contract

Periodic by Contract

0 1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Interurban network

- 21 -

1999

2000

Urban network

2001

2002

Annex 1g Condition of the Network CONCRETE YEAR

CONDITION

2002

GOOD

2001 2000

84%

1318

52%

684

16%

337

10%

3752

32%

FAIR

10%

12%

799

31%

2090

50%

1276

37%

4321

37%

BAD

433

17%

1373

33%

1792

53%

3644

31%

422

100%

394

100%

800

100%

2550

100%

4147

100%

3405

100%

11717

100%

422

87%

343

95%

549

81%

1309

50%

682

16%

264

3569

30%

FAIR

12%

14%

902

34%

2106

51%

1259

38%

4436

38%

BAD

433

16%

1373

33%

1798

54%

3650

31%

488

100%

362

100%

678

100%

2644

100%

4162

100%

3321

100%

11654

99%

3.6%

3.4%

4.2%

GOOD

6.8%

3.1%

21.8%

5.8%

35.4%

22.7%

29.1%

35.7%

100.0%

28.5%

422

87%

343

95%

549

81%

1309

50%

682

16%

264

3569

31%

FAIR

12%

14%

902

34%

2106

51%

1259

38%

4436

38%

BAD

433

16%

1373

33%

1798

54%

3650

31%

488

100%

362

100%

678

100%

2644

100%

4162

100%

3321

100%

11654

100%

TOTAL % NETWORK

1999

Km 670

% NETWORK

4.2%

3.1%

5.8%

22.7%

35.7%

28.5%

100.0%

GOOD

340

68%

318

91%

381

74%

893

33%

417

10%

193

2541

22%

FAIR

151

30%

120

23%

1148

42%

1859

44%

994

30%

4303

37%

BAD

677

25%

1926

46%

2124

64%

4749

41%

501

100%

349

100%

514

100%

2717

100%

4202

100%

3311

100%

11593

100%

474

89%

296

94%

372

82%

1288

50%

748

17%

274

3452

30%

FAIR

16%

855

33%

2222

52%

1303

41%

4504

40%

BAD

452

17%

1312

31%

1625

51%

3428

30%

535

100%

315

100%

455

100%

2595

100%

4282

100%

3202

100%

11384

100%

TOTAL % NETWORK

4.3%

GOOD 1998

TOTAL

DIRT

95%

TOTAL

TOTAL % NETWORK

1997

TREATMENT

375

GOOD

4.4%

3.0%

4.7%

2.8%

23.4%

4.0%

36.2%

22.8%

100.0%

28.6%

37.6%

28.1%

100.0%

GOOD

380

63%

144

63%

267

71%

1191

48%

993

23%

451

14%

3427

30%

FAIR

195

33%

34%

25%

824

33%

1847

43%

1315

40%

4355

39%

BAD

484

19%

1451

34%

1546

47%

3525

31%

600

100%

227

100%

377

100%

2500

100%

4290

100%

3313

100%

11307

100%

TOTAL % NETWORK

1996

GRAVEL

87%

% NETWORK

5.3%

2.0%

3.3%

22.1%

37.9%

29.3%

100.0%

GOOD

395

62%

52%

225

70%

1019

41%

870

20%

451

14%

3058

27%

FAIR

222

35%

45%

25%

907

36%

1874

43%

1247

38%

4415

39%

BAD

579

23%

1571

36%

1619

49%

3813

34%

642

100%

185

100%

320

100%

2505

100%

4315

100%

3317

100%

11285

100%

TOTAL % NETWORK

1995

COVER

UNPAVED SURFACE

ASPHALT

369

TOTAL

5.7%

1.6%

2.8%

22.2%

38.2%

29.4%

100.0%

GOOD

371

57%

48%

130

47%

888

35%

892

21%

552

19%

2912

27%

FAIR

253

39%

49%

125

45%

1230

49%

1252

29%

1262

43%

4201

39%

BAD

415

16%

2124

50%

1091

38%

3677

34%

645

100%

165

100%

275

100%

2533

100%

4268

100%

2905

100%

10790

100%

TOTAL % NETWORK

6.0%

1.5%

2.5%

23.5%

39.6%

26.9%

100.0%

GOOD

356

55%

15%

31%

578

25%

521

13%

246

1809

18%

FAIR

279

43%

140

85%

153

56%

1364

58%

1893

46%

989

36%

4817

47%

BAD

13%

417

18%

1696

41%

1536

55%

3694

36%

645

100%

165

100%

271

100%

2358

100%

4111

100%

2771

100%

10321

100%

TOTAL % NETWORK

6.2%

1.6%

22.9%

2.6%

39.8%

Condition of Unpaved Network

26.8%

100.0%

Condition of Paved Network

4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

3000 2500

Kilometers

1994

ASPHALT

CONCRETE/ASPHALT

CONCRETE

2000 1500 1000 500 0

1994

1995

1996

1997

GOOD

1998

1999

FAIR

2000

2001

2002

BAD

1994

1995

1996

1997

GOOD

- 22 -

1998

1999

FAIR

2000

BAD

2001

2002

Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Annex 2a Project Cost by Component (estimated at Appraisal) Project Cost by Component

IBRD IADB GOP US$ million US$ million US$ million

1. CIVIL WORKS 1.1 Interurban roads Road Rehabilitation Routine Maintenance (pilot project) Bridge rehabilitation/improvement Road Signage and Traffic Safety Rural roads Capira-Sajalices 1.2 Urban streets Street Rehabilitation Routine Maintenance Corridors and Traffic Management Schemes Road Signage, signalization and Traffic Safety Subtotal

Total

20.26 0.50 0.00 1.65 0.00 8.29

80.23 0.00 24.81 0.00 0.00 0.00

26.88 49.24 3.97 3.31 3.31 6.27

127.37 49.74 28.78 4.96 3.31 14.56

7.44 0.00 7.55 2.21 47.90

6.62 0.00 6.62 0.00 118.28

7.44 9.10 16.28 1.10 126.90

21.50 9.10 30.45 3.31 293.08

2. EQUIPMENT 2.1 Signals and Signal System 2.2 Vehicles 2.3 Computers and others Subtotal

0.99 0.11 0.10 1.20

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

0.50 0.05 0.25 0.80

1.49 0.16 0.35 2.00

3. CONSULTING SERVICES 3.1 Pre-investment studies and design services 3.2 Supervision services 3.3 Studies 3.4 Technical assistance 3.5 Training Subtotal

0.70 0.00 0.00 4.55 0.25 5.50

3.31 0.83 0.66 2.44 0.21 7.45

4.96 8.27 0.00 0.32 0.03 13.50

8.97 9.10 0.66 7.31 0.49 26.53

BASIC PROJECT COST Physical Contingencies Price Contingencies BASE COST IDB Financing Costs Project Costs Other Investments TOTAL PROGRAM COSTS

54.60 0.00 5.40 60.00 0.00 60.00 0.00 60.00

125.73 12.57 13.70 152.00 28.00 180.00 10.00 190.00

141.28 13.48 14.70 169.46 0.43 169.89 245.00 414.89

321.61 26.05 33.80 381.46 28.43 409.89 255.00 664.89

- 23 -

Annex 2b Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) Expenditure Categories 1. Civil Works 2. Equipment

LCB 62.5 (45.0) 1.8 (1.1)

3. Consulting Services 64.3 (46.1)

TOTAL

Procurement Method (1) Actual/Latest Estimate ICB Other NBF 11.0 297.9 (8.3) (0.0) 0.20 (0.10) 9.8 26.7 (5.5) 11.0 10.0 324.6 (8.3) (5.6) (0.0)

Total 371.4 (53.3) 2.0 (1.2) 36.5 (5.5) 409.9 (60.0)

(1) Figures in parenthesis are the amounts financed by the Bank loan. All costs include contingencies.

Annex 2c Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ millions/equivalent)

Expenditure Categories 1. Civil Works

LCB 44.6 (33.5)

2. Equipment

3. Consulting Services TOTAL

44.6 (33.5)

Procurement Method (1) Actual/Latest Estimate ICB Other 19.9 (14.3) 0.6 (0.5) 7.3 (7.2) 20.5 7.3 (14.8) (7.2)

NBF 347.4 (0.0) 4.0 (0.0) 52.4 (0.0) 403.8 (0.0)

Total 411.9 (47.8) 4.6 (0.5) 59.7 (7.2) 476.2 (55.5)

(1) Figures in parenthesis are the amounts financed by the Bank loan. All costs include contingencies.

- 24 -

Annex 2d Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Component IBRD

Estimates at Appraisal IADB Govt. IBRD IADB

Actual/Latest Estimate IBRD IADB Govt. IBRD IDB

Percentage of Appraisal IBRD IADB Govt. IBRD IDB

1. CIVIL WORKS 1.1 Interurban roads Road Rehabilitation Routine Maintenance (pilot project)

20.26 0.50

Bridge rehabilitation / improvement Road Signage and Traffic Safety

80.23

5.06 0.13

21.82 49.11

24.81 1.65

136.34

8.39 0.03

132.00

1.06 0.22

1.70

1.66 0.23

6.04

3.97 0.41

2.90

Rural roads Capira-Sajalices

21.58 0.11

0.31

0.12

0.19

0.29

7.83

3.04

0.94

0.48

3.31 8.29

6.27

1.2 Urban streets Street Rehabilitation Routine Maintenance

7.44

6.62

1.86

5.58 9.10

Corridors and Traffic Management Schemes Road Signage, signalization and Traffic Safety Pedestrian Bridge

7.55

6.62

4.28

12.00

0.55

2.21

5.94 2.75

10.23

2.31 1.07

0.25

0.10

1.22

0.47

Widenings and extensions

6.78

2.64

Intersection improvements

0.98

0.38

67.00

0.80

1.55

1.24

0.11

0.18

12.00

2. EQUIPMENT 2.1 Signals and Signal System

0.99

0.24

0.26

0.24

0.09

0.24

0.38

2.2 Vehicles

0.11

0.02

0.03

0.19

0.08

1.73

4.00

2.3 Computers and others

0.01

0.25

0.03

7.00

0.12

0.07

3.92

3. CONSULTING SERVICES 3.1 Pre-investment studies and design services 3.2 Supervision services

0.70

3.31

4.96

0.52

0.03

8.00

0.74

0.01

1.61

5.40

0.83

8.27

3.13

1.51

12.00

0.58

1.82

1.45

3.3 Studies

0.66

0.36

0.55

3.4 Technical assistance

4.55

2.44

0.32

3.52

0.14

0.77

0.06

3.5 Training

0.25

0.21

0.03

0.02

0.42

0.08

2.00

4.1. Contingencies and Financial Costs

0.50

54.2

28.61

TOTAL

60.00

180.00

4. OTHER

19.07

150.82

- 25 -

27.05

55.45

180.00

3.00

18.77

222.00

0.50

0.92

1.00

0.10

0.98

1.47

Annex 2e Program Financing (in US$ million equivalent):

IBRD IADB Government TOTAL

Estimated 60.00 180.00 169.89 409.89

% 15 44 41 100

Actual 55.45 180.00 240.77 476.22

% 12 38 50 100

% 76 24 100

Actual 55.45 18.77 74.22

% 75 25 100

Project Financing (in US$ million equivalent)

IBRD Government TOTAL

Estimated 60.0 19.07 79.07

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits Component

A. Road Improvements Concepción – Volcán Volcán – Cerro Punta San Miguelito – Villa Zaíta Río Chagres – Río Gatún Capira - Sajalices

SAR Estimate Costs NPV IERR US$ US$ million million 4.95 6.69 2.77 5.36 11.5

12.09 3.51 34.69 40.31 9.2

52.4 24.8 139.3 101.8 19.61

- 27 -

Actual Costs NPV IERR US$ US$ million million 4.79 6.21 2.77 5.11 10.87

7.62 1.98 14.66 60.77 17.45

22.4 15.4 52.0 76.5 29.9

Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle Month/Year

Count

No. of Persons and Specialty (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Specialty

Identification/Preparation 03/24/1993

MISSION LEADER. (1); URBAN TRANSPORT ENG. 1)

Appraisal/Negotiation 07/28/1993

MISSION LEADER. (1); URBAN TRANSPORT ENG.(1)

04/20/1994

08/10/1994

12/21/1994

04/28/1995

09/29/1995

07/17/1996 10/08/1996

1 2

04/15/1997

08/05/1997 10/27/1997

1 2

05/17/1998

09/30/1998

03/02/1999 11/05/1999

1 1

URBAN TRANSPORT ENG. (1); TRANSP/ENVIRON.ECONOM. (1); PRINCIPAL ENG.SPECIAL. (1); TRANSP.PLANNER/TRAIN. (1) URBAN TRANSPORT ENG. (1); PRINCIPAL TRS. SPEC. (1) URBAN TRANSPORT ENG. (1); PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT (1) URBAN TRANSPORT ENG. (1); TRANSP/ENVIRON.EXPERT (1); PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT (1) TRANSP/ENVIRON.EXPERT (1); PRINCIPAL TRANSP.SPEC. (1) TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1) SECTOR LEADER (1); TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1) TRANSPORT ENGINEER/ECO (1) TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1) ENGINEER (1); TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1) TRANSPORT ENGINEER/ECO (1) HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); HDM SPECIALIST (1) ENGINEER/ECONOMIST (1) TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1)

Performance Rating Implementation Development Progress Objective

Supervision

- 28 -

S S

11/05/1999

05/01/2001

11/16/2001

11/16/2002

09/25/2003

03/02/2004

TEAM LEADER (1); FIN MNGT SPECIALIST (1); ECONOMIST (1) TEAM LEADER (1); FINANCIAL SPECIALIST (1) TEAM LEADER (1); SOCIAL SPECIALIST (1) TASK MANAGER (1); FINANCIAL MGT (1); TRAFFIC SPECIALIST (1); PROCUREMENT ASS'T (1) TEAM LEADER (1); SOCIAL SPECIALIST (1); SOCIOLOGIST (1); FINANCIAL SPECIALIST (1) TASK MANAGER (1); ACCOUNTANT (1); SOCIAL SPECIALIST (1)

TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1); CONSULTANT (1)

ICR

(b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Identification/Preparation Appraisal/Negotiation Supervision ICR Total

Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) 41.9 119.5 31.2 87.7 145.5 659.5 8.35 59.71 227.0 926.41

- 29 -

Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

Macro policies Sector Policies Physical Financial Institutional Development Environmental

Rating H SU H SU H SU H SU H SU H SU

M M M M M M

N N N N N N

NA NA NA NA NA NA

H H H

SU SU SU

M M M

N N N

NA NA NA

H H H

SU SU SU

M M M

N N N

NA NA NA

Social Poverty Reduction Gender Other (Please specify) Indigenous Peoples Development Plan Private sector development Public sector management Other (Please specify)

- 30 -

Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Lending Supervision Overall

Rating HS HS HS

S S S

U U U

HU HU HU

S S S S

U U U U

HU HU HU HU

Marginally Satisfactory 6.2 Borrower performance Preparation Government implementation performance Implementation agency performance Overall

Rating HS HS HS HS

- 31 -

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents l

Project Supervision Reports 1994 – 2003

Amendment to the Loan Agreement 1999

Amendment to the Loan Agreement 2002

Project Files

- 32 -

Additional Annex 8. Project Evaluation by Borrower REPÚBLICA DE PANAMA MINISTERIO DE OBRAS PÚBLICAS PRÉSTAMO 3686 – PAN BIRF INFORME DE CIERRE DE LA IMPLEMENTACION DEL PROYECTO DE REHABILITACIÓN Y ADMINISTRACION VIAL ENERO, 2004 1. Evaluación del Diseño y del Desarrollo de los Objetivos 1.1. Componente de Rehabilitación y Administración Vial Las obras y acciones en esta área perseguían los siguientes resultados: l

Reducir los costos de trasporte mediante la rehabilitación y el mejoramiento de la infraestructura vial que haya superado su vida útil o se encuentre en riesgo de perderse adecuándola para permitir capacidad, seguridad y eficiencia en el tránsito.

Aumentar la eficiencia y productividad del mantenimiento a través de la participación del sector privado en las actividades de rehabilitación, mantenimiento periódico y rutinario y supervisión de obras.

Reducir el problema de congestión e inseguridad vial, a través de mejoramiento en sectores críticos de la red, que incluyen la ampliación de algunos tramos, la mejora de ciertas intersecciones y la dotación o complementación de señalización, semaforización y la aplicación de medidas de administración del tránsito destinadas a mejorar la eficiencia y seguridad para peatones, vehículos de carga y de pasajeros que utilizan la infraestructura vial.

Este componente dentro del Programa de Rehabilitación Vial comprendió inversiones para el desarrollo vial urbano e interurbano, mediante obras de rehabilitación, mejoramiento y mantenimiento de la red vial pavimentada y revestida y caminos de producción, obra de rehabilitación, ensanche y mejoras de vías urbanas, pasos elevados y peatonales, y semaforización y regulación del tráfico urbano. a. Vías urbanas El componente de Desarrollo Urbano tenía como objetivos (i) mantener, rehabilitar y mejorar la infraestructura vial urbana de la Ciudad de Panamá y otras ciudades del interior del país, (ii) mejorar la eficiencia del movimiento de personas y cargas en el medio urbano, mediante el uso de medidas de administración del tránsito de bajo costo y alta rentabilidad, (iii) mejorar la seguridad del tránsito; (iv) apoyar la participación del sector privado en el mantenimiento vial; y (v) apoyar la modernización de la administración vial y la planificación del desarrollo vial urbano; y diseñar e implementar gradualmente reformas de política institucional, financiera, operativa, legal y regulatoria en el sector de transporte urbano. Originalmente se tenía previsto un 45% del costo del proyecto. Comprende: Rehabilitación Vial, Mantenimiento Periódico, Mantenimiento Rutinario, Ensanche de Calles Urbanas, Mejoras a Intersecciones, Puentes Carreteros y Peatonales, Señalización y Semáforos y Seguridad Vial.

- 33 -

b. Vías interurbanas El componente interurbano del Programa tenía como objetivos: (i) reducir los costos del transporte mediante la rehabilitación y mejora de la infraestructura vial que haya superado su vida útil o se encuentre en riesgo de perderse; (ii) promover la participación del sector privado en las actividades de mantenimiento y rehabilitación vial, supervisión de obras y gestión de algunas vías mediante concesión, y (iii) resolver el problema de congestión y seguridad vial, a través de mejoras en sectores definidos y críticos de la red, la mejora de ciertas intersecciones y la dotación de señalización vial. Originalmente se tenía previsto un 45% del costo del proyecto. Comprende: Rehabilitación Vial, Mantenimiento Periódico, Mantenimiento Rutinario, Puentes carreteros y peatonales, Señalización, seguridad vial y Caminos rurales. c. Fortalecimiento institucional y reformas políticas Las metas de las acciones para fortalecimiento institucional del MOP fueron: l

Racionalizar la estructura actual del MOP, con base en un plan acordado para racionalizar recursos humanos y materiales de mantenimiento; y privilegiar las actividades normativas, planificadores y de fiscalización.

Dar cumplimiento a la Ley de pesos y dimensiones vigente, estableciendo un control efectivo para limitar el peso de la carga de los vehículos circulando la red vial.

Fortalecer la unidad ambiental del MOP para realizar un control efectivo del impacto ambiental de las obras de infraestructura vial; y

Capacitar al personal de las diversas unidades del MOP, incluyendo las áreas administrativas de pavimentos y del mantenimiento, conteos de tráfico, privatización del mantenimiento rutinario vial, planeación del transporte, ingeniería de tránsito y sistemas de administración del transito, seguridad vial, supervisión de la industria del transporte y adquisiciones.

Contratación de consultores para análisis de los sistemas de contratación de mantenimiento, normas de diseño vial, control de cargas y planeación del transporte, y apoyo a la administración y acciones del programa.

2. Logro de los Objetivos y Rendimientos 2.1. Resultado y Logro de los Objetivos Los resultado y logros obtenidos mediante la implementación de este programa son satisfactorios ya que se logró ejecutar un 96% de la totalidad del préstamo, aunque en un periodo de tiempo mas largo al indicado en la propuesta inicial de los objetivos del programa. El programa tiene un porcentaje de avance físico del 96% y hasta la fecha se han contratado obras, adquirido bienes y contratado servicios por un monto de 74.22 millones de balboas. De este monto contratado se ha pagado 72.58 millones de balboas de los cuales 54.7 millones corresponden a fondos del préstamo, y representaron un desembolso de 91% del mismo, y la diferencia, 18.32 millones de balboas se han pagado con fondos locales. Con esta inversión se han atendido un total de 508.68 kms de la Red Vial Nacional.

- 34 -

2.2. Resultados por Componentes a. Componente de Rehabilitación y Administración Vial Subcomponente Desarrollo Urbano Durante la implementación del Programa de Rehabilitación Vial se realizaron dentro del subcomponente de desarrollo urbano un total de cuarenta y tres (43) proyectos viales. Entre las que podemos mencionar obras tales como: la Ampliación de las Avenidas José A. Arango, José M. Torrijos, 3 de Noviembre; el Mejoramiento de 4 intersecciones; la Construcción de siete (7) Pasos peatonales, cinco de ellos terminados (Beckman, Lajas, Juan Díaz, San Pedro No 1 y Súper X-tra), dos más en construcción (en la vía José Agustín Arango y en la vía Domingo Díaz frente UTP-Tocumen); la Rehabilitación de Calles en Centros Urbanos tales como: Santiago, Boquete, Puerto Armuelles, Chitré, Penonomé, Panamá, Colón, etc. También se han ejecutado proyectos de Mantenimiento Periódico en Chorrera, Arraijan, Pedregal, Juan Díaz, Ancón, Río Abajo, etc. y obras de señalización vial en las ciudades de Panamá y Colón, rehabilitando así 273.36 kms de la red vial urbana. A continuación detallamos los resultados por categoría: l

Rehabilitación vial: Dentro de la red vial urbana, 118.78 Km. fueron rehabilitados en diferentes ciudades importantes del país, mediante la ejecución de 18 proyectos realizados durante el periodo 1994 al 2003.

Mantenimiento periódico: Se ejecutaron diez (10) proyectos de mantenimiento para 77.83 Km. de la red vial urbana.

Ensanche de calles urbanas: Se llevaron a cabo tres (3) proyectos con un total de 8.10 kms de ensanche dentro de la Ciudad de Panamá.

Mejoras a intersecciones: Se realizaron cuatro (4) proyectos para la mejora de intersecciones dentro de la Ciudad de Panamá.

Puentes carreteros y peatonales: Se logró construir y finalizar siete (7) pasos peatonales para beneficio de comunidades y escuelas en la ciudad de Panamá y Colón.

Señalización y semáforos: Se completó un proyecto de señalización para servir a 49.09 Km. de la red vial urbana.

Programa piloto de mantenimiento rutinario: Se terminaron dos (2) proyectos mediante la implementación del programas de mantenimiento piloto, efectuando así mantenimiento a 18.75 kms de la red vial urbana.

Subcomponente Vías Interurbanas Las obras interurbanas incluyen nueve (9) proyectos de Rehabilitación y Ensanche de carreteras tales como: Capira – Sajalices, San Carlos - Río Hato, Río Hato – Antón, Carretera Transístmica Tramos San Miguelito – Villa Zaíta y Puente Río Chagres – Puente Río Gatún, Concepción – Volcán, Volcán – Cerro Punta y Soná – Guarumal – El Tigre de San Lorenzo. Además se desarrollaron obras de señalización vial y actividades de mantenimiento rutinario a través de un Programa Piloto, rehabilitando así 235.32 kms de la red interurbana. A continuación detallamos los logros y resultados obtenidos por categoría: l

Rehabilitación vial: Se logró finalizar la rehabilitación de 182.38 Kms de la red vial interurbana

- 35 -

mediante la ejecución de ocho (8) proyectos durante el periodo de 1995 al 2003. l

Señalización y seguridad vial: Se ejecutó un solo proyecto de señalización en el área interurbana para servir a 42.84 Km. de la red vial interurbana.

b. Componente de Fortalecimiento Institucional Dentro del componente de Fortalecimiento Institucional se han contratado servicios por un monto de 4.21 millones de balboas, de los cuales 0.52 millones han sido en estudios, 3.6 millones en asistencias técnicas y 0.2 millones en capacitación. Entre las consultorías más importantes están la Planificación del Transporte Urbano Fase I y II, el Estudio de Seguridad Vial y Tránsito e identificación de Sitios Peligrosos, Alternativas para el Financiamiento del Mantenimiento, la Campaña de Seguridad Vial y la Actualización del Inventario y Condición de Red Vial Interurbana, Aforo de Tránsito y Sistema de Administración Vial. Adicionalmente se realizó la adquisición de bienes mediante una inversión de 0.69 millones de balboas en la compra de equipos para diferentes direcciones del Ministerio de Obras Públicas como son Dirección Nacional de Mantenimiento (DINAMAN), la Unidad Especial Coordinadora (UECP), la Unidad Ambiental del MOP, Dirección Nacional de Tránsito y Transporte Terrestre (DINATRATE) ahora Autoridad de Tránsito y Transporte Terrestre (ATTT) y para el Ministerio de Gobierno y Justicia (Policía de Tránsito). Se adquirieron principalmente equipos computacionales, vehículos, radares, motos, kit de primeros auxilios, etc. En el caso de la Unidad Ambiental del MOP se han adquirido vehículos y equipos de monitoreo de calidad del aire, agua, medidores de ruido, cámaras fotográficas digitales, filmadoras, etc. Este equipo se ha distribuido en las tres oficinas de la Unidad Ambiental: Panamá, Herrera y Chiriquí. Al mismo tiempo se licitaron servicios de Inspección y Supervisión de Obras (11 en total) por un monto de 3.13 millones de balboas. A continuación le detallamos por categoría los resultados obtenidos mediante la implementación de este programa dentro de este componente: l

Estudios: Se realizaron tres (3) estudios por el monto de 0.5 millones de balboas durante el periodo de vigencia de implementación del préstamo.

Asistencias Técnicas: Se efectuaron aproximadamente veintitrés (23) proyectos de asistencia técnica por el monto de 3.6 millones de balboas. Estos proyectos estaban enfocados en apoyar las diferentes Direcciones del Ministerio mediante evaluaciones, sistematizaciones, consultorías, asesorías y servicios en las áreas de transporte, mantenimiento, seguridad vial, impacto ambiental, auditorias y contabilidad.

Capacitación: Se logró realizar mediante este préstamo capacitaciones locales y en el extranjero enfocadas principalmente en temas de rehabilitación y mantenimiento de vías. Se financió un total de cuarenta y cinco (45) capacitaciones durante el periodo de vigencia de implementación del préstamo, por el monto de 0.2 millones de balboas.

Inspección y supervisión de obras: Se contrató la inspección y supervisión privada de once (11) proyectos viales urbanos e interurbanos por un monto de 3.13 millones de balboas.

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3. Valor presente neto / Tasa de Retorno Económica Para el cierre del proyecto, se efectúo una revisión de cinco proyectos, los cuales fueron financiados con fondos del Banco Mundial (BIRF), a los cuales se les realizó un estudio de factibilidad económica antes de ser llevado a cabo y comprobar si las hipótesis planteadas en el momento del estudio son válidas, o dicho de otro modo después de terminada la obra se han logrado los beneficios esperados. El análisis económico se realizó con la ayuda del modelo HDM-III; obteniéndose buenos indicadores de rentabilidad. Los resultados obtenidos en el presente estudio nos muestran claramente que las rehabilitaciones de estas carreteras, las cuales fueron llevados a cabo en años anteriores, han cumplido su objetivo. La ejecución de un proyecto de rehabilitación trae consigo la disminución de los costos de transporte, el tiempo de recorrido, reducción de los accidentes de tráfico y el mejoramiento en la seguridad de los usuarios. Evidentemente todos estos beneficios contribuyen con el mejoramiento del nivel de vida y desarrollo de la región. Se identificaron los proyectos de mayor relevancia en el país, los cuales se les había realizado un estudio de factibilidad económica con el modelo HDM-III en su etapa de planificación, para que la comparación fuese óptima. Los proyectos seleccionados son los siguientes: (i) Carretera Concepción – Volcán; (ii) Carretera Volcán - Cerro Punta; (iii) San Miguelito – Villa Zaíta; (iv) Río Chagres – Río Gatún; y (v) Capira – Sajalices. Para la evaluación económica de este grupo de proyectos se utilizó el Modelo HDM-III, para así hacer una comparación de los beneficios generados por este proyecto al día de hoy. Se utilizaron datos generados por el Inventario Vial desarrollado por la empresa TNM (Technology and Management), al igual que los datos de aforos del año 2002 realizados por esta misma empresa. Luego se procedió a realizar una corrida con el modelo HDM-III con los datos de la carretera en su condición actual y comparados con la política de rehabilitación con la que se rehabilitó el camino. Los resultados obtenidos se muestran en las tablas anexadas para cada uno de los proyectos seleccionados. (ver anexos) a. Resultados económicos Los indicadores de rentabilidad económica tales como el Valor Presente Neto (VPN), la Tasa Interna de Retorno (TIR) de los beneficios después de haber recuperado la inversión inicial descontados al 12%, obtenidos para cada uno de los proyectos analizados, están basados en los flujos económicos de los costos y los beneficios netos mostrados en las tablas resúmenes. Valor Presente Neto El valor presente Neto es la actualización de los flujos de costos y beneficios del proyecto para todo el período de análisis. La tasa de descuento corresponde al costo de oportunidad de capital que ha sido considerado en 12%.

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Tasa Interna de Retorno La tasa interna de retorno se define como aquella tasa de descuento que anula el valor presente neto, siendo rentables aquellos proyectos cuyo TIR sea mayor que el costo de oportunidad, que para este proyecto se considera 12%. b. Comparación de los resultados económicos La siguiente tabla nos muestra una comparación de los indicadores económicos arrojados por el estudio de factibilidad económica antes de realizarse la obra y los mismos después de realizada la obra.

Nombre del Proyecto Concepción – Volcán Volcán – Cerro Punta San Miguelito – Villa Zaíta Río Chagres – Río Gatún Capira - Sajalices

TIR (antes del proyecto) % 52.40 24.8 139.3 101.8 19.61

TIR (después del proyecto) % 22.4 15.4 52.0 76.5 29.9

VAN (antes del Proyecto) en millones de B/. 12.09 3.51 34.69 40.31 9.2

VAN (después del Proyecto) en millones de B/. 7.62 1.98 14.66 60.77 17.45

4. Impacto en el Desarrollo Institucional Mediante la eficiente utilización de los recursos destinados para el Fortalecimiento Institucional, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas logró capacitar al personal en diversas áreas como son la Administración Vial, el Mantenimiento de Vías, Uso del Modelo HDM-IV, Instalación y uso de paquetes computacionales para el área contable y en el manejo de algunos programas de informática. Adicionalmente se logró adquirir equipos computacionales, software y vehículos para equipar a las diferentes Direcciones del MOP con nueva tecnología para un mejor desempeño laboral e institucional. Se proporcionó mayor seguridad vial mediante la adquisición de equipos para la policía de tránsito como son radares, radios y motocicletas. Además de la contratación de un estudio de sitios peligrosos con su respectiva recomendaciones. Se capacitaron funcionarios de la Dirección de Tránsito y Transporte Terrestre (DINATRATE), hoy en día Autoridad del Tránsito y Transporte Terrestre (ATTT), durante la ejecución de la asistencia técnica de Planificación del Transporte Urbano de la Ciudad de Panamá. 5. Principales Factores que Afectaron la Implementación y Resultados A continuación le mencionamos los factores que consideramos afectaron en gran parte la ejecución total de este programa: 5.1. Factores fuera del Control del Gobierno l

Durante la implementación de este préstamo se efectuaron importantes cambios políticos en el país. En el año 1994, exactamente después de la firma del Convenio de Préstamo, se efectuaron elecciones nacionales en el país, y en consecuencia inició una nueva administración en el Ministerio de Obras Públicas diferente a la que suscribió el Convenio, la cual estableció sus propias estrategias y prioridades, dentro de las cuales procuraron adaptar el convenio

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recientemente suscrito con el Banco, e iniciando un proceso de adaptación y aprendizaje de los procedimientos, normativas y políticas del Banco. Similar proceso aconteció en el 1999, cuando nuevamente se efectuaron elecciones nacionales y en consecuencia inició una nueva administración en el Ministerio de Obras Públicas. l

Durante la vigencia del Convenio hubo cambios en los procedimientos del Banco y en sus políticas, así como también de las autoridades que manejaban el convenio, lo cual implicaba un proceso de actualización por parte del Ministerio de los nuevos requerimientos del Banco.

Con la aprobación del Banco, se realizaron en el año 2003 un total de 18 Licitaciones Públicas para la contratación de la rehabilitación de calles en centros urbanos del país por un monto aproximado de 4.3 millones de dólares, los cuales serían financiados con los remanentes del préstamo; no obstante, la negación de la solicitud de prorroga elevada al Banco hizo imposible que estos proyectos entraran bajo el convenio. Los referidos actos públicos ya se habían realizado, y estaban finalizando sus trámites de adjudicación.

Adicionalmente, durante la vigencia del Convenio hubo diversos fenómenos de la naturaleza que afectaron el país con fuertes lluvias, extendiendo la estación de invierno en nuestro país, lo que ocasionó que los proyectos mantuviesen un ritmo de avance por debajo de lo proyectado.

Por varios años, durante la ejecución del Convenio, el manejo de la documentación relativa a la contratación de obras y servicios era remitida al Banco físicamente, las veces que se requiriese hasta su aprobación, lo cual dilataba el proceso. Con la implementación masiva del internet en nuestro país, se solucionó este factor.

La conducta administrativa y procesal de los proponentes en los actos públicos, de utilizar indiscriminadamente los recursos que la Ley les ofrece para impedir la adjudicación de un acto público, en el cual no han salido seleccionados.

5.2. Factores Sujetos al Control del Gobierno l

La falta de una iniciativa legislativa que simplifique los procedimientos de contrataciones públicas, basados en la experiencia poco eficaz de la normativa que existe en el país en esta materia.

La falta de Programación y Planificación Nacional a mediano y largo plazo que permita alcanzar objetivos nacionales en materia de infraestructura vial, indistintamente del cambio administrativo que acontece cada quinquenio.

La falta de Coordinación Interinstitucional que se ha dado en algunos periodos de la vigencia del Convenio entre instancias que esencialmente deben colaborar mancomunadamente como por ejemplo: entre el organismo ejecutor (Ministerio de Obras Públicas) y el ente contratante frente al Banco (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas).

Las elecciones gubernamentales de los años 1994 y 1998 produjeron cambios en los puestos directivos de la Unidad Coordinadora y en otras direcciones en todo el Ministerio, lo que implicó un periodo de adaptación y capacitación del nuevo personal a los procedimientos del

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Banco para el financiamiento y desembolso de fondos para los proyectos, lo que trajo como consecuencia una demora en la ejecución del programa. 5.3. Factores Sujetos al Control Institucional l

En el año 1994, el Ministerio adelantó un proceso de selección para la contratación del Proyecto de Semaforización de la Ciudad de Panamá el cual no finalizó exitosamente, siendo retomada la tramitación posteriormente en 1998. Acontecido el cambio de Administración en 1999, por las elecciones nacionales, las nuevas autoridades solicitaron una prórroga al Banco para ejecutar el Proyecto de Semaforización. El proyecto debía ser ejecutado por la Dirección Nacional de Tránsito y Transporte Terrestre del Ministerio; no obstante en el año 2000 dicha dependencia se convirtió en la Autoridad de Tránsito y Transporte Terrestre y dejó de formar parte de la institución, no logrando presentar al Banco los documentos requeridos para seguir adelante con el Proyecto, en el plazo concedido para estos efectos.

Se experimentó dificultad en el flujo de fondos del programa debido a los complejos procedimientos administrativos para la asignación de partidas presupuestarias para los diferentes proyectos, así como la insuficiencia de recursos para la contrapartida local.

Las numerosas solicitudes y reclamos presentados por las contratistas y proveedores del Ministerio, solicitando modificaciones a sus contratos, tanto en sus cuantías como en los periodos de ejecución de las obras o de entrega de los bienes, lo cual dilata la ejecución de los proyectos en espera de la decisión institucional de cada solicitud de reclamo.

La falta de estabilidad laboral del personal técnico que inspecciona los proyectos viales, lo cual merma la solidez y contundencia de sus informes o pronunciamientos al demandar de los contratistas el cumplimiento de lo establecido en los contratos de obra.

La modificación del organigrama del Ministerio, a fin de nuevamente colocar a la Unidad Especial Coordinadora (UECP) bajo la dependencia del Despacho Superior, y no como subordinada a la Dirección de Planificación Financiera y Presupuesto (DIPRODI).

5.4. Factores Sujetos al Control de la Agencia de Implementación l

La falta de apoyo y coordinación entre la Unidad Especial Coordinadora (UECP) y las restantes direcciones que guardan relación con la ejecución de proyectos: Mantenimiento, Inspección, Estudios y Diseños, Contratos, Presupuestos y Contabilidad, en algunos periodos de la vigencia del Convenio.

Promover el acercamiento permanente y directo con el Despacho Superior, a fin de contar con su aval en las diversas decisiones administrativas que se adopten en el ejercicio de las funciones de la Unidad Especial Coordinadora (UECP).

La falta de capacitación y entrenamiento del personal de la Unidad Especial Coordinadora (UECP) para efectos de promover su permanente actualización de conocimientos y motivarles en el ejercicio diario de las funciones, así como también la adaptación de las infraestructuras de la Unidad acorde con sus funciones.

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6. Sostenibilidad La sostenibilidad del proyecto se considera “muy probable”, debido a los programas existentes de mantenimiento de carreteras en el país, en los que ha sido primordial la planificación apropiada de la inversión de los recursos asignados para este fin y la prevención del deterioro de las obras realizadas. Adicionalmente, contamos con programas de financiamiento en los que los contratos de las obras incluyen el mantenimiento del proyecto por un periodo de cinco (5) años como parte del contrato y consideramos que esta iniciativa es una herramienta eficaz para la sostenibilidad de los proyectos. 7. Actuación del Banco y del Prestatario 7.1. Actuación del Banco a. Prestando asistencia en la preparación del Proyecto Consideramos satisfactoria la asistencia del Banco en la preparación del Proyecto. La preparación del Proyecto fue realizada atendiendo las necesidades prioritarias del sector vial. Adicionalmente, consideramos que la decisión de incorporar dentro del programa el componente de Fortalecimiento Institucional fue acertada ya que se logró mejorar el ambiente laboral al adquirir importantes instrumentos de trabajo, así como la capacitación pertinente, todo lo cual se refleja en la eficiencia y calidad de los trabajos realizados en el MOP. b. Supervisando Se considera satisfactorio el desempeño del Banco en la supervisión del préstamo. A través de los años de ejecución de programa se realizaron varias misiones de supervisión que fueron programadas simultáneamente entre el MOP y el Banco, y en las cuales se organizaban giras técnicas a los diferentes proyectos, visitas a las diferentes instancias gubernamentales y reuniones para solventar problemas y aclarar incertidumbres relacionadas a los procedimientos tanto del Banco como del Ministerio de Obras Públicas para el financiamiento, contratación y ejecución de los proyectos. Adicionalmente se supervisaba el avance financiero del Programa, incluso con el apoyo de consultores del Banco que analizaban detalladamente los registros contables llevados en la Unidad Especial Coordinadora. c. Actuación global del Banco Se considera la actuación global del Banco satisfactoria en todas las etapas del programa. Consideramos que la administración, supervisión, asesoramiento y comunicación continua con la Unidad Coordinadora del Programa fue el indicado para lograr cumplir con gran parte de los objetivos del préstamo, dando solución a las necesidades de diferentes sectores del país y logrando así rehabilitar y mejorar gran parte de la red vial principal. 7.2. Actuación del Prestatario a. En la preparación del Proyecto Consideramos la participación del Prestatario en la preparación del proyecto satisfactoria. Los objetivos principales del préstamo estaban de acuerdo a las necesidades existentes en el país, claramente especificadas y sustentadas al Banco. Se estimó la inversión necesaria para atender los mismas y se elaboraron los objetivos, metas y resultados a esperar del Convenio en atención a esto. b. Actuación del gobierno en la implementación del Proyecto Calificamos la actuación del Gobierno en la implementación del Proyecto como satisfactoria, considerando - 41 -

que durante la vigencia del Convenio hubo dos elecciones nacionales que implicaron un cambio de las personas que regentan los destinos de país, tanto en el Órgano Ejecutivo y Legislativo, como en el resto de las dependencias gubernamentales. Esta alternabilidad del poder, bajo las circunstancias históricas vividas hace escasos años en nuestro país, representa un factor positivo y de alto valor: el respeto de los principios democráticos garantizados mediante un proceso electoral transparente. c. Agencia de implementación La actuación de la agencia de implementación en este caso la Unidad Especial Coordinadora (UECP) se considera satisfactoria. La supervisión, administración, coordinación y manejo del programa llevado a cabo por la UECP y la comunicación eficaz con las agencias involucradas en la ejecución de las obras fue fundamental para el logro de los objetivos del Convenio. d. Actuación global del prestatario La actuación del prestatario se considera satisfactoria. Se logró realizar en gran parte los objetivos principales del programa. Las obras ejecutadas con los fondos de este préstamos son obras que promueven el desarrollo del sector vial y para una mejor calidad del transporte interno en el país. 8. Lecciones Aprendidas l

La ejecución del convenio aportó un amplio conocimiento y permanente actualización de las políticas del Banco, su normativa y procedimientos a nivel institucional, específicamente en la Unidad Coordinadora de Programas, con lo cual se hizo más efectivo la preparación de los actos públicos, los pliegos de cargos, los estudios ambientales y de factibilidad económica, etc.

La eficiente ejecución de un convenio de préstamo está directamente relacionado con el alto nivel de coordinación que la unidad ejecutora logre establecer a nivel institucional, (involucrando al resto de las Direcciones afines) e interinstitucional (con otros Ministerios y entidades oficiales, tales como el Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, la Contraloría General de la República, y otros), de tal manera que el avance físico y financiero del convenio sea un logro del equipo gubernamental en beneficio de las comunidades del país.

En el esfuerzo de ejecutar el convenio, la unidad ejecutora debe considerar que por la naturaleza de la relación contractual y financiera, el Banco se constituye en su primordial colaborador, por lo que es imprescindible manejar un alto nivel de comunicación que permita al Banco conocer las necesidades e inquietudes actuales de la Institución y, respetando los objetivos del Convenio, atender las mismas con la mayor prontitud. Bajo este marco de permanente comunicación se logra forjar un equipo (Institución-Banco) comprometido con el logro de los resultados trazados.

Se debe elaborar una estrategia nacional de desarrollo de la red vial, que establezca metas a corto, mediano y largo plazo, y con la cual se comprometan las diversas instancias de decisión del país, de manera que sin distingo de cual administración gobierne el país, se respete dicha estrategia y se alcancen los objetivos y metas de la misma.

La modernización institucional ha aportado numerosos beneficios en el manejo con los organismos de financiamiento, como lo es el manejo electrónico de informaciones y datos que requieren los Bancos y permiten avanzar con mayor celeridad en el cumplimiento de los procedimientos. Por tanto, debemos apoyar este proceso de modernización y actualización del Ministerio.

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Debe iniciarse una iniciativa de reforma legislativa para modificar los procedimientos de contratación pública en el país, a fin de simplificarlos significativamente, resguardando los principios de transparencia, libre concurrencia y competencia.

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[PDF] Document of The World Bank - Free Download PDF (2024)

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President, World Bank Group	Ajay Banga
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